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Abstract
Differences in promotion across genders are still prevalent in many occupations. Recent
work based on experimental evidence indicates that women participate less in or exert lower
effort during contests. We exploit the unique features of the promotion system for French
academics to look at women’s attitudes towards competition in an actual labour market.
Using data for academic economists over the period 1991-2008 we find that, conditional
on entering the competition, there is no difference in promotions across the genders, which
is difficult to reconcile with either discrimination or a poorer performance of women in
contests. In contrast, women have a substantially lower probability than men to enter the
promotion contest. Our data does not support that this gap is due to differences in costs or
in preferences concerning department prestige, indicating that women are less willing than
men to take part in contests.
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1 Introduction
Despite the rapid increase in female educational attainment over the last decades, the labour
market outcomes of men and women still differ in terms of wages and particularly in seniority.
The literature on gender wage gaps is vast, but differences across genders in promotions have
received much less attention.1 These gaps can be large. For example, Bertrand and Hallock
(2001) find that women account for only 2.5 percent of top executives in US firms. Differences
in characteristics account for a large proportion of the gap, with the remaining fraction being
usually attributed to preferences or discrimination. A recent literature has proposed an alter-
native explanation, namely that women tend to be less likely to enter competitions and tend
to perform worse in competitions than men2. Since promotions to top jobs tend to be highly
competitive, such behaviour could explain why we observe fewer women in these jobs. Existing
evidence is based on experiments conducted in laboratory conditions, and although the results
present strong support for gender differences in attitudes during and towards contests, it is not
obvious that such attitudes are also prevalent in actual labour markets.
This paper uses the particular features of the French academic system, namely the fact that
promotions occur through national contests, to look at the effect of gender on attitudes towards
competition. In the US and the UK academic systems or in private sector jobs only information
on actual promotions is available, while the list of applicants tends not to be known.3 In France,
academics are public servants and promotion occurs through a national contest or concours,
with the lists of applicants being publicly available at the time of the concours. We can hence
examine how gender affects both the likelihood that an academic applies for promotion and
the probability of promotion conditional on having applied. As a result, we can ask whether
the lower observed promotion rate of women is due to lower success in competitions or to their
unwillingness to enter them.
Using data for academics has important advantages. Unlike in many private sector jobs,
where a promotion is associated with longer hours and a requirement for greater availability
outside normal working hours, academics have similar obligations and constraints at all hier-
archical levels. Even if more senior academics tend to be involved in university administration
and outside responsibilities such as participating in committees, seeking funding or performing
editorial activities, these activities are to a large extent voluntary. They are not ‘required’
by the promotion and not performing them would not imply that the individual is demoted.
Female associate professors should thus not feel more constrained in terms of combining career
and family duties by becoming full professors, and there is hence no obvious reason why they
would prefer not to be promoted. Male and female academics are also likely to have rather
homogeneous labour market attachment, as argued by Kahn (1995), removing one of the rea-
sons often branded to justify lower promotion rates for females. A further advantage of these
data is that, unlike for most types of jobs, the key consideration in actual promotion deci-
1For an overview of work on gender wage gaps see Blau and Kahn (2000). See Lazear and Rosen (1990) for a
theorical analysis of gender gaps in promotion and Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1997) and Goldin and Rouse
(2000) for empirical evidence.
2See Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval
(2013)
3An exception is the analysis of auditions for orchestra membership and promotion in Goldin and Rouse
(2000).
1
sions, an individual’s productivity (publications), can be observed and thus controlled for by
the researcher.
In this context, we consider several potential causes of the unexplained component of pro-
motions gaps. On the one hand, women may be less likely to be promoted conditional on
having applied, and this could be due either to discrimination or under-performance during the
concours. On the other, female academics may have a lower propensity to apply for promotion
than males, which could be explained by the requirements of the contest being more costly for
women, to their facing a different tradeoff between salaries and department prestige, or simply
to an unwillingness to enter the contest. The special features of the French academic system,
such as a national salary scale, the need to go through a national contest in order to be pro-
moted, and the existence of several categories of academics with different requirements during
the contest and upon promotion, allow us to test for these hypotheses.
We use data for academic economists in France over the period 1991 to 2008, and find lower
promotion rates for women, which are partly but not completely explained by the age structure
and publication records. We then consider separately the determinants of the likelihood to enter
a promotion concours and the probability of being promoted conditional on having entered the
concours. The latter is unaffected by gender, thus rejecting the idea that females underperform
in contests, and lending no support to the presence of discrimination against women. In contrast,
being a woman has a substantial negative effect on the likelihood to enter the concours.
We explore several potential explanations for this difference. We find no evidence that
either a different trade-off between income and department prestige nor the cost undertaking
the concours and the mobility implications associated with it (see below) are the causes of
the gender gap. The results seem to indicate that women are less willing than men to enter
competitions for promotion, and this could be due either to different attitudes towards contests
or to the expectation of being discriminated against. When we look at features of each year’s
concours, we find evidence consistent with both aspects.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we provide evidence on female attitudes
towards competition in an actual labour market and hence add to the growing body that has
addressed this question but which has so far been based on experimental evidence; see Gneezy
et al. (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al.
(2013). Our conclusions are partly supportive of what the experimental literature has found.
In line with the results in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and
Gupta et al. (2013) we find that once we control for observed productivity women are less likely
than men to enter the concours and that this difference does not depend on the visible costs
associated with the contest. In contrast, we find no evidence that women are less likely to be
promoted conditional on being a candidate, which can be interpreted as a lack of evidence for
the under-performance in contests found by Gneezy et al. (2003).
The paper also contributes to the literature using data on academics to try to understand
gender gaps in labour markets, which dates back to the seminal work of Cole and Cole (1973).
Early on, empirical analyses identified both lower wages and lower promotion rates for female
economists; see Johnson and Stafford (1974) and Farber (1977). More recent work, such as
Ginther and Hayes (1999) and Ginther and Kahn (2004), indicates that in the US salary gaps
are explained by differences in academic rank, while promotions to tenure and to full professor
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rank are still affected by gender even after controlling for research output and demographic
characteristics. Some studies claim a decline in the promotion gap over time, while others find
that it is large even in recent decades; see McDowell, Singell and Ziliak (2001) and Ginther and
Kahn (2004). Evidence for the UK by Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) indicates that there
are both gaps in promotions and in within-rank pay across genders, and their findings suggest
that these are partly due to differences in the outside offers received by men and by women,
while Sabatier (2010) documents the existence of a promotion gap in France.
Most of this literature has considered the US and the UK, which have an academic labour
market with much greater wage and promotion flexibility than those found in most European
countries. Our paper focuses on a different promotion system, and thus we can examine whether
promotion gaps also exist in a labour market that operates in an entirely different way, with
salaries being fixed at the country-wide level and promotions being decided by national com-
mittees and not by the department where the individual is employed.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 starts by examining the possible reasons why
women are less likely to be promoted, we then describe the French academic system and explain
how the different hypotheses can be tested. Section 3 describes the data, an exhaustive panel
of academic economists in France over the period 1991 to 2008. Our results are presented in
section 4, while section 5 concludes.
2 Why are there so few female professors?
2.1 Discrimination, differences in payoffs or self-selection?
Although a substantial literature has examined the promotion gap across genders, a clear expla-
nation is still lacking. Women may be less likely to be promoted either because they apply for
promotion less often than men or because of a lower probability of being promoted conditional
on being a candidate. These differences may in turn have three possible causes: discrimination,
differences in costs of or rewards from promotion across genders, and different attitudes in and
towards the promotion process itself. Let us consider them in turns.
The first possible explanation is simply that those making the promotion decisions discrim-
inate against women. This discrimination may be due to tastes or statistical, and implies that
a promotion committee would, for given research output and performance during the selection
process, prefer to promote a man. Female candidates may also be less likely to succeed if they
tend to under-perform in contests, as shown by Gneezy et al. (2003). As we will see below, the
competitive nature of the promotion process for (most) academic promotions in France implies
that if women ‘hold back’ during competitions they may perform worse than men and hence
will be promoted less often. Both discrimination and underperformance during the promo-
tion process will result in female candidates having a lower likelihood of promotion than male
candidates.
Alternatively, women may differ in the objective costs of and rewards from promotion and
this can make them less willing to apply, which in turn result in different observed promotion
rates. There can be various causes of differences in the propensity to seek promotion. First,
there may be costs associated with promotion, and if these are higher for women than for
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men, they could result in the former applying for a promotion less often than men. In France,
promotions tend to require moving to a different department and thus tend to imply moving to
a different city (see below for details on the French academic system). If women’s bargaining
power in the household is lower, it may be harder for female than for male academics to impose
the cost of moving on their families. As a result, the cost of a promotion is probably higher for
women and hence they will be less likely to seek promotion.
Another reason why women may be less likely to apply for promotion is if the payoff is lower
than for men. One possible cause of differences in payoff is that women may have different
preferences over department prestige and income. Suppose that women have a lower marginal
utility of income because, often, they are the second earner in the household. They may then
be willing to be in a more prestigious department even if it implies lower wages. Since in the US
and UK more prestigious departments also have tougher promotion thresholds (see McDowell
et al. (2001)), this would result in a lower promotion probability for women.
Lastly, women may choose not to apply for promotion even if we observe no objective differ-
ences in the cost or payoff of promotion. This type of ‘self-selection’ out of the promotion race
can be due to two reasons. On the one hand, female academics may expect to be discriminated
against during the promotion process. Such a belief will reduce the expected payoff and hence
the propensity to seek promotion. Note that this may happen even in the absence of actual
discrimination. On the other hand, women may choose not to apply for promotion simply be-
cause they are less inclined to compete in tournaments than men, as indicated by experimental
evidence; see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al.
(2013) as well as the discussion in Bertrand (2011). While certain aspects of an academic career,
such as obtaining a PhD, depend only on individual performance, promotion typically entails
a competition between various candidates in which only one gets the price. If women are less
inclined to enter competitions, then they will apply less often for promotion even if costs and
benefits are the same.
Existing work has had difficulty in testing these different hypotheses. Part of the problem
is the fact that, in most countries, there exists no record of who applied for promotion. It
is hence impossible to know whether the higher probability of men to hold a senior position
is due to a lower conditional probability of success of women or to their lower propensity to
apply. Moreover, even if data on applications were available, the tradeoff that exists in the
Anglo-Saxon academic system between prestige of the department and promotion thresholds
makes it difficult to assess the possible causes of a lower application propensity. In contrast, the
French system presents a number of features that will allow us to evaluate the various options.
We next turn to a description of these.
2.2 The French academic system
The French academic system has a number of features that we intend to exploit to test the
above hypotheses. There are two types of academic positions in France. The most common are
university positions, where the individual is a professor with a substantial teaching load. There
exist also a number of public research instances, of which the largest is the Cnrs, that have pure
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research positions.4 Researchers in this category are hired by the Cnrs, who pay their salaries,
but are attached to a university and are hence located in its economics department just like the
university professors are. Researchers have the possibility to undertake some teaching and they
participate in department life in the same way as standard professors.
For all types of position there is an entry level category equivalent to assistant professor,
termed ‘Rank B’, which includes the maˆıtre de confe´rences positions at the university and
the charge´ de recherche at the Cnrs. The individual can then be promoted to ‘Rank A’, the
equivalent to full professor, a position denoted directeur de recherche at the Cnrs. Both rank A
and rank B positions are tenured, which implies that an individual who does not get a promotion
can spend her/his entire career in a ‘junior’, i.e. rank B, position. Because of this possibility, we
will term the two types of positions ‘rank A’ and ‘rank B’, rather than junior and senior. The
promotion from rank B to rank A entails a substantial salary increase and a much steeper slope
for salaries over time. The salary scales are identical for university professors and researchers
and set by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research.5
Promotions take place through a national contest, a concours, and are thus not decided
by the department in which the individual holds her/his current position.6 Participation in
this contest is public information, and at the end of it a list with the ranking of those that
have undertaken it is published. The fact that departments do not make promotion decisions is
important for our purposes. In a system in which there is a positive correlation between prestige
and promotion threshold, women could choose to select into less prestigious department because
promotion is easier in those, and hence the measured gap would underestimate the actual
promotion gap. A second feature of the French system is that there is no relationship between
department prestige and salaries. Academic salaries are determined according to a national
scale based on rank, and rank is decided at the national level.7 There is thus no reason to prefer
being employed in a less prestigious department since salaries are the same across universities
and the threshold for promotion is set nationally.
Members of the national committees that decide on promotion are academic economists,
drawn from various universities in the country and areas of expertise. Committees tend to
be large and represent a wide spectrum of universities, not necessarily the most prestigious.
Because members of these committees have to be of the full professor rank and because of
the age distribution of the population of academics, there is a strong male dominance in these
committees. Committees change regularly, every two to four years depending on the particular
instance.
The requirement of the concours differs across the two academic tracks. For university
4Cnrs stands for Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. There are other instances, such as the Institut
National de la Recherche Agronomique, which accounts for about 5% of the academic economists in France.
Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain the list of candidates for promotion for those and hence will not
include them in our analysis.
5Within each broad rank, A and B, there are subranks that affect salary. Subrank promotion is also decided
by a national committee, although the cost here is minimal, with application for a promotion requiring filling a
form and submitting a vitae. Promotion to a higher subrank does not involve change of department, the number
of promotions is not fixed ex ante, and the list of candidates is not public knowledge.
6Some internal promotions exist for individuals that have undertaken substantial administrative tasks at the
university, but they are rare. See Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008) for more details.
7Some departments pay, out of their own funds, an extra salary on top of the one paid by the university/cnrs.
This practice is, however, restricted to only a few members in a handful of departments.
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professors the contest, termed concours d’agregation, is biannual and entails four stages over,
approximately, a 6-month period. It includes a research seminar, and three oral exams both
in the candidate’s field and in economics in general, one of which consisted of preparing in
24 hours a lecture on a topic randomly drawn by the applicant from a lengthy predetermined
list. The concours hence takes time and requires substantial preparation outside the candidates
field of expertise. In contrast the effort involved in the Cnrs promotion concours is minimal.
The candidate simply declares him/herself a candidate for a position as directeur de recherche
(DR2) and submits a vitae and research proposal to the committee. This concours takes place
annually.
There is a second difference in terms of the costs involved in the two systems. For university
professors, departments publish before the start of the contest the positions that they have
available. At the end of the concours, the candidates choose, sequentially and starting with
the highest ranked, which university to join. When promoted, the individual is usually not
able to stay in the university where s/he held a rank B position and has to move to a different
department.8 After three years s/he is allowed to move to another university, if the latter
wishes to recruit her/him, including the university where s/he held the rank B position. For
researchers, academics that are promoted can choose to stay at the university where they are or
move to another department. The university does not need to have an open position for them
since the researchers’ salary is always paid by the Cnrs.
It is obvious that promotion is very costly for university professors. There is a cost that in
principle is gender-neutral, the cost of preparing the various exams. The agregation also involves
a substantial cost ex post both because of the geographical mobility involved in being promoted
to full professor, but also because the individual faces considerable uncertainty about where
s/he will be eventually recruited if s/he passes the contest since where s/he ends up depends on
her/his ranking and hence on the entire pool of candidates. Since candidates seeking to become
full professor are typically between 30 and 40 years of age, the process occurs at a moment in the
life-cycle when family constraints are likely to be substantial. If women are less geographically
mobile than men, then the cost is likely to be greater for them.
There are hence two differences between the agregation and the Cnrs concours. First, the
former involves substantial costs that do not exist for the later, notably the fact that successful
candidates need to change department. The second difference is that performance during the
contest only matters in the agregation, as in the Cnrs the committee bases the decision on the
vitae without meeting the candidates.
2.3 Testing the different hypotheses
We can use the features of the French academic system to confront the various hypotheses about
lower promotion rates for women. In order to do so, we will examine both the determinants of the
likelihood to apply for promotion and of the probability of obtaining a promotion conditional
on being a candidate. We start by considering the gender gap in the probability of success
conditional on being a candidate for promotion, and examine two possible explanations for a
difference across the sexes:
8In our sample, 80% of those promoted through the agregation have a new affiliation after their promotion.
6
Under-performance in contests: If women tend to perform less well than men in contests,
we expect to find a negative impact of being female on the conditional probability of promotion
in the agregation. The absence of a gender gap in this probability can then be interpreted as
no difference in the performance of women and men under competitive conditions.
Discrimination: Identifying discrimination is difficult. On the one hand, a negative impact
of being female on the conditional probability of promotion can also be due to the presence of
discrimination, and there is no feature of the data that would allow us to distinguish the effect
of underperformance from that of discrimination. On the other, the absence of a gender effect
could be the result of offsetting forces, with discrimination against women being compensated
by better unobserved characteristics of women (not correlated to observed characteristics). As
a result, it is not possible to rule out discrimination even in the absence of a significant gender
effect.
Turning to the probability of being a candidate for promotion, we can test for two potential
explanations for differences at this level by comparing the two tracks in the French academic
system:
Higher cost of promotion: In the US system, it is not clear why women may have different
costs of promotion from men. The nature of academia and the substantial flexibility associated
with this type of jobs implies that jobs at the junior or senior level are equally likely to be
compatible with family life. As a result, there is no reason why women would prefer not to be
promoted. In contrast, in the French system, the mobility required if promoted (of professors
but not researchers) implies that there is a very specific cost: the need to move to another
university and hence, in most cases, to another city. It is possible that this cost is, on average,
higher for women than for men, implying that the latter are less likely to apply for promotion.
To test this hypothesis we can exploit the difference between the implications of promotion for
standard professors and for researchers. If women were not trying to get promoted because
of the cost of mobility, we would expect to find a more negative effect of being female on the
probability of applying for promotion for professors than for researchers.
Differences in preferences about prestige and salary : We can also exploit the difference be-
tween promotion implications for professors and researchers to test the hypothesis of different
preferences over salary and prestige across genders. Since for university professors being pro-
moted to a senior position requires changing department, promotion brings a higher salary at
the risk of having to move to a less good department. If women are less willing to trade-off
prestige for income, then those who hold a junior position in a top department may not want to
apply for promotion. In contrast, for junior researchers promotion does not require a change of
department, and there is no reason for women not to seek promotion even if they are in a top
department. If women have a stronger preference for department prestige and/or a lower one
for income, those with a university position will be less willing to apply for promotion if they
are in a top department than if they are not. Because promotion does not require changing
department for researchers, we would expect to find no differences in the probability of applying
for promotion for female researchers across departments.
Alternatively, the impact of gender on the probability of promotion may be common across
the two tracks, implying that the differences in the propensity to seek promotion are due to
either beliefs or attitudes towards contests. Testing for these effects is difficult. However, the
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conditions under which the aggregation takes place can provide proxies for both a measure of
expected discrimination and the competitive environment. We consider these in turns.
Expected discrimination: To examine whether women’s belief that they will be discriminated
against affects their propensity to seek promotion, we proxy expected discrimination by the
fraction of rank A professors that are women in a particular year, as a greater fraction could be
interpreted by candidates as weaker discrimination. A positive effect of this variable interacted
with being female would indicate that women’s decision to seek promotion responds to the
observed promotion rate of women in the past.
Unwillingness to participate in contests: Women may also have different attitudes from men
concerning contests, and, in particular, be unwilling to take part in them. If this is the case, they
are likely not to respond to changes in the payoff from being a candidate. We hence consider the
effect of changes in the likelihood of promotion, which we measure by the number of available
positions of rank A in a particular year. A greater number of positions should increase a potential
candidate’s expected payoff and hence make him/her more likely to enter the competition. A
positive coefficient on this variable hence indicates that candidates respond to this ‘objective’
measure of the likelihood of promotion, while no effect implies that individuals’ decision to be
a candidate is determined by considerations other than the probability of promotion, which in
the case of women could be an unwillingness to enter competitions.9
2.4 Empirical specification
In line with the existing literature, we suppose that the probability of individual i being rank
R at year t is given by
Pr(R, i, t) = Φ
(
X ′itβj
)
(1)
where the two states R are being rank A or not, the subscript j = u, r denotes whether we are
looking at data for university professors or researchers, and Φ (.) denotes the logistic density
function. The term X ′itβ in equation (1) is
X ′itβj = βj0 + β
f
j0 δi + βj1 Ageit + βj2 Age
2
it + βj3 Pubit
+βj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + βj5 Pubit ×Quality it (2)
implying that the probability of promotion is a function of age Ageit and its square, whether or
not the individual has published in Econlit-classed journals (i.e. whether s/he is a ‘publisher’
measured by the dummy Pubit), the number of publications and the average quality of these
publications, denoted respectively Quantity it and Quality it, both measured in logs (see below
for the exact measurement). The variable δi is a dummy taking the value 1 for females, so
that βf0 measures the differences in promotion probability for men and women with the same
characteristics. We would have liked to control for characteristics of the individual’s family life,
9A question that we have not addressed is whether the degree of competition is greater for university professors
or for researchers. On the one hand, a much smaller number of researchers are promoted each year in the Cnrs
than in the concours d’agregation. On the other, although the list of candidates and rankings are available on
internet for both, the agregation solicits much greater interest from the academic community, with results at
each stage being widely followed and discussed, which increases the preasure on candidates. It is hence difficult
to argue that one or the other contest is more competitive.
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such as whether s/he is married and the number and ages of children, but such data were not
available.10
The probability of holding a rank A position is obviously a combination of the probability
of applying for promotion and that of obtaining a promotion conditional on having applied. We
hence model separately the two process. Consider first the probability that individual i applies
for promotion (i.e. takes the concours) at time t, which we assume to be
Pr(C, i, t) = Φ
(
X ′itγj
)
(3)
where the two states C are being a candidate for promotion or not and
X ′itγj = γj0 + γ
f
j0 δi + γj1 Ageit + γj2 Age
2
it + γj3 Pubit
+γj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + γj5 Pubit ×Quality it (4)
+γj6 Deptit
The dummy Deptit has a value of 1 if the candidate is in a top department (see below for the
definition) and will capture whether individuals in top departments are less likely to apply for
promotion because of the mobility costs involved.
Lastly, the probability of success in a concours conditional on being a candidate is given by
Pr(S, i, t|Cit = 1) = Φ
(
X ′itαj
)
(5)
where the two states S are succeeding or failing in the concours (i.e. being promoted or not),
Cit is a dummy that takes the value one if the individual applied for promotion, and
X ′itαj = αj0 + α
f
j0 δi + αj1 Ageit + αj2 Age
2
it + αj3 Pubit
+αj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + αj5 Pubit ×Quality it (6)
+αj6 Deptit
Obviously, the qualities that lead to promotion conditional on applying are also those that make
a potential candidate apply, hence it is not possible to run a selection model.
Equations (1) and (2) capture the mechanism usually examined in the literature on academic
promotions. Assuming that the estimated coefficient β̂fj0 is different from zero, we can then
estimate the two other models to see to what extent the difference in the probability of being
rank A is due to women being less likely to enter the concours or to them having a lower success
rate in the concours than men. That is, we will compare estimates of γfj0 and α
f
j0.
10In the light of existing evidence, this is likely not to be a major omission; for example, Ginther and Kahn
(2004) find that having children has only a weak effect of the promotion probabilities of female economists in the
US and none on their productivity.
9
3 The Data
Our sample consists of the entire population of French academic economists provided by the
French Ministry of Higher Education and Research and the Cnrs for the years 1991 to 2008. For
each individual we have information on age, rank, publication stock (see below) and department.
We keep only individuals that are in departments larger than 4 full-time equivalent academics,
which removes economists that are isolated in universities without real economics departments.
Those (few) individuals for whom some of the individual characteristics (age or position for
instance) are missing are also excluded.
In order to examine separately the determinants of the probability of applying for promotion
and the likelihood to succeed in the concours, we use the list of candidates that applied to and
those who succeeded in becoming a rank A university professor or a rank A Cnrs researcher
(DR2). For professors we have the lists of candidates to promotion and actual promotions for
the nine biannual concours taking place from 1992 to 2008, while for researchers we have the
six annual concours between 2003 and 2008.
We define as potential candidates for promotion all academic economists of rank B the
year prior to the concours. It is important to note that it is possible for Cnrs researchers to
take the agregation, and some individuals in our dataset do so. In contrast, although it is in
principle possible for rank B university professors to apply for a rank A Cnrs position, there
are in our data no such individuals. This is probably due to the fact that few promotions are
available each year (between 2 and 4) and they are perceived as being internal promotions for
those already in the Cnrs. We hence consider as potential candidates for the agregation all
academic economists in France of rank B, which yields 10,383 observations, while we have 681
observations for candidates susceptible to apply for Cnrs promotions.11
We define two categories of department, somewhat equivalent to the division in the US
between the top-50 and other departments. France has a substantial number of national aca-
demic publications in French, and hence we define prestigious departments as those that have
the largest research output in international journals (see Appendix A for details). For this
reason, we will term them ‘international’ departments and the rest ‘national’ departments. The
international departments account for about one third of the population each year.
3.1 Measuring research output
Our key explanatory variable is an individual’s research output, and we measure the output of
individual i at date t by her/his cumulative publication record between the first year for which
we have an observation for that individual and date t.12 We merge the data on publications with
the list of French academics that includes individual characteristics (position, department, age,
gender), merging by surname and initial, and then correct manually for those individuals having
the same name and initial. Publication records are measured as weighted sums of publications.
11The difference in the number of observations is mainly due to the fact that the Cnrs acounts for a small
fraction of academics. We have, on average, 114 rank B researchers each year and 1,040 rank B university
professors. Hence, there are each year 114 potential candidates for promotion at the Cnrs and 1,154 potential
candidates to promotion through the agregation, which include both rank B professors and rank B researchers.
12As an alternative, we have computed degressive publication scores, with older publications having a smaller
weight than recent ones. Measuring research output this way does not change our results.
10
All publications come from the EconLit database, which includes more than 560,000 papers
published in more than 1200 journals between 1969 and 2008. Three dimensions enter the
weighted scheme of publications: the quality of journals, the number of authors and the relative
number of pages.
We measure the quality of publications using the journals weighting scheme proposed by
Combes and Linnemer (2010). Two different degrees of convexity in the distribution of journals’
weights have been proposed by Combes and Linnemer, and we use the most convex one (i.e.
the one that most values quality), but our results are unchanged when we use the least convex
one. We also consider the number of authors of each publication, and assume constant returns
to scale at the coauthor level, so that we divide each publication by the number of authors,
a standard practice in the literature. Lastly, since many journals now publish both notes and
longer papers, we weight by the number of pages to capture the idea that longer articles contain
more ideas. We consider an article’s length relative to the average length in that journal, so
that the ratio of the number of pages of article a over the average number of pages of articles
published in the journal is used as weight. Because editors’ policies can vary over time, the
mean number of pages is calculated for each year separately.
The output of a researcher i at date t is then a weighted sum of her/his articles a published
between the first year in which s/he published an article, t0, and date t, implying that
yit =
∑
a∈[t0,t]
W (a)
n(a)
p(a)
p¯
(7)
where p(a) is the number of pages of article a, p¯ is the annual average number of pages of articles
in the journal, n(a) the number of authors of the article, and W (a) the weighting scheme for
journals. Then, each individual receives three scores: a dummy equal to 1 if s/he has at least
on publication in an EconLit-listed journal, the quantity of single-author-equivalent published
articles, and the average quality of her/his articles, defined as yit divided by quantity, i.e.∑
a∈[t0,t] 1/n(a).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1: Percentage rank A by gender in 2008
rank A Total % Women % Men %
Total sample
0 1425 67.7 512 83.0 913 61.4
1 680 32.3 105 17.0 575 38.6
University professors (91% of population in 2008)
0 1321 69.0 477 83.5 844 62.8
1 593 31.0 94 16.5 499 37.2
Cnrs Researchers (9% of population in 2008)
0 104 54.5 35 76.1 69 47.6
1 87 45.5 11 23.9 76 52.4
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Table 1 gives the decomposition of our sample in terms of institutional affiliation and rank
for the most recent year in our data, 2008. There were 2,105 (Cnrs and university) academic
economists in France that year, and the vast majority of the population consists of university
professors, with researchers accounting for only 9% of the total. Women account for 29% of
observations, and they are over-represented amongst university professors and under-represented
amongst researchers, where they account for only 24% of the population. This difference could
be due to the fact that obtaining a position as a researcher tends to require a stronger publication
record than for university positions and, as we will see below, women tend to have a weaker
research output than men.
Slightly under a third of the population hold a rank A position, with the fraction being lower
for university professors (31%) and higher for researchers (45.5%). Note that the data do not
seem to indicate that women choose a career path that offers higher average promotion rates,
which would counterbalance negative discrimination. Our data shows that feminisation is lower
for researchers, which have a higher promotion rate, indicating that there is no selection of this
type taking place. The gender promotion gap is large, 22 percentage points on average, and is
smaller for university professors than for researchers (21 and 29 points, respectively).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of potential candidates
Univ’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
Min. Max. Mean Std. err. Min. Max. Mean St. err.
Women
Prob. Candidate 0 1 0.062 0.241 0 1 0.103 0.305
Prob. Promotion 0 1 0.020 0.140 0 1 0.018 0.133
Age 27 68 41.6 8.9 29 64 42.8 9.1
Publisher 0 1 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.83 0.37
Quantity 0 15.0 1.02 1.55 0 15.0 3.14 3.22
Quality 0 62.5 0.42 2.83 0 16.6 1.01 2.31
Prob. Int. Dept. 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.58 0.49
Men
Prob. Candidate 0 1 0.084 0.277 0 1 0.186 0.389
Prob. Promotion 0 1 0.033 0.179 0 1 0.044 0.205
Age 25 70 45.2 9.4 28 65 43.5 10.0
Publisher 0 1 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.91 0.29
Quantity 0 21.2 1.33 2.05 0 16.6 3.70 3.03
Quality 0 116.8 0.46 3.18 0 86.5 2.42 6.27
Prob. Int. Dept. 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.58 0.49
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Productivity measures (quantity and quality)
are in levels. We take their logs in the regression analysis. There are 10,383 observations from 2,136 individuals
and 681 observations from 158 individual in the university and Cnrs samples respectively. These correspond to
687 women (3,328 observations) and 1,449 men (7,055 observations) in the university sample and 54 women (223
observations) and 104 men (458 observations) in the Cnrs sample.
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the sample of potential candidates. We have
10,383 observations, including a total of 2,136 academics. The panel is unbalanced as individu-
als enter the pool of potential candidates (usually when they get their PhD) and exit it either
because they are promoted or because they leave academia or the country over our sample
period, with the average number of observations per individual being 4.9 years. The probability
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of being a candidate to the aggregation is 6% for women and 8% for men, while for researchers
these figures are 10% and 19%, implying a much larger gap. The (unconditional) probabilities
of being promoted on a given year are small, 3% to 4% for men, and 2% for women. The table
indicates that some of these differences are likely to be explained by differences in observable
characteristics. Women are on average 3 years younger than men in the aggregation sample
(though not in the Cnrs). The main difference lies in publication records. In our larger sample,
the probability of publishing in EconLit journals is 57% and 55% for men and women, respec-
tively. This figure is not large, but it is important to bear in mind that our publication criteria is
stringent, especially given the strong tradition in France to publish books and the large number
of national journals, some of which are not in EconLit. The quality of publications is somewhat
higher for men (0.46 compared to 0.42), while the quantity of publications is 30% higher for
men. For the sample of researchers, we find a higher probability of being a publisher but a
greater gender gap (91% for men but only 83% for women), and a particularly large difference
in the quality of publications.13
The definition and construction of our two categories of departments is detailed in Ap-
pendix A and Table 10 gives the list of ‘international departments’. The last lines in the two
panels of Table 2 indicate that the one aspect in which women seem to fare better than men
is affiliation: in the larger sample 32% of women are in international departments, while only
28% of men are. When we focus only on researchers we find no difference in affiliation across
the genders.
4 Results
4.1 The promotion of academic economists
We start by examining the determinants of being rank A for the entire population, which are
reported in Table 3. In order to run regressions equivalent to those found in the literature on
promotions in academia, where only outcomes are observed, we construct a sample that includes
all rank A and rank B academics for each of the years that we will be using latter on to estimate
the probability of being a candidate and of being promoted conditional of being a candidate.
This gives us a sample of 16,077 observations. We can thus estimate the probability of holding
a rank A position. All specifications include year fixed effects. In column (1), only time fixed
effects and gender are included in the logit model, with the gender dummy being equal to 1
for women. The marginal effect on gender is significant at the 1% level and large, implying an
odds ratio of 0.31.14 Including age reduces the effect on gender from -0.233 to -0.165, indicating
that a large fraction of the difference in promotion is indeed due to the fact that the sample
of women is younger than that of men. Column (3) includes our three measures of research
13Obviously some of the differences in research output are due to the age structure of the two populations, but
Bosquet and Combes (2013b) show that even when controlling for age women have worse publication records.
Women are sometimes also found to be cited less than men. This is the case in political sciences, as shown by
Maliniak, Powers and Walter (2013), while for publications in biomedical and exact sciences, Kelchtermans and
Veugelers (2013) find that women have a lower probability of reaching top citations but once they do they are as
likely as men to stay there. In contrast, the data we use exhibits no gender gap in citations once research output
is controlled for; see Bosquet and Combes (2013a).
14This values is obtained from exp(−1.182), −1.182 being the coefficient associated to the −0.233 marginal
effect.
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output: whether or not the individual publishes, the quantity of publications and their quality.
All three are highly significant and increase the probability of promotion.
Table 3: Likelihood to hold a rank A position: panel 1992-2008, marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logit logit logit logit probit OLS
Women -0.233a -0.165a -0.053a -0.049a -0.048a -0.044a
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.015a 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a 0.007a
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.325a 0.331a 0.329a 0.341a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Pub*Quantity 0.148a 0.151a 0.152a 0.178a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pub*Quality 0.040a 0.041a 0.041a 0.038a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cnrs -0.089a -0.081a -0.093a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Women*Cnrs -0.042c -0.039 -0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.040 0.114 0.367 0.369 0.368
Observations 16077 16077 16077 16077 16077 16077
log-likelihood -9963 -9195 -6573 -6548 -6559 -6833
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Once we control for research output, the effect of gender falls to -0.053, about a quarter
of the initial one, indicating that the lower promotion rate for women is to a large extent due
to them having published less. The effect is nevertheless still strong: being a woman reduces
the probability of promotion almost as much as having one rather than two single-authored
publications. The effects we obtain are comparable to those found for the US. Ginther and
Kahn (2004) find a raw gender gap of -0.213, which falls to -0.130 once age and publication
records are included, indicating that differences in publications across genders explain a greater
fraction of the gap in France than in the US.
Column (4) includes a dummy for being a researcher and its interaction with Women, and
indicates that the negative effect of being a woman on seniority is stronger for the Cnrs, although
this term is significant only at the 10% level. Columns (5) and (6) report the estimations of a
probit and an OLS model, respectively, and indicate that the result that women are less likely to
be promoted are robust to the use of those specifications. There is however no robust evidence
of a difference between the two tracks, with the coefficient on Women*Cnrs being insignificant.
The result that women have lower promotion rates than men contrasts with evidence on
affiliation. Table 11 in Appendix B examines the likelihood for an individual to be in an
international department, using the same explanatory variables as above. Women are more
likely to be in a prestigious department than men, and the effect of being a woman on the
probability of being in an international department is large.15 These results are surprising. As
15The positive effect of being female on the likelihood of being in an international department may have three
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argued by Lazear and Rosen (1990), it is hard to understand why women would be discriminated
against in promotions but not in other labour market experiences. In fact, in many instances
the evidence tends to indicate that women have a lower probability of both being promoted and
being hired, as for example in the case of top US orchestras; see Goldin and Rouse (2000). This
does not seem to be the case for academic economists, and raises the question of whether the
low promotion rate of female academics has a cause other than discrimination.
4.2 Decomposing outcomes
4.2.1 Gender differences in success in the concours
The limitation of our analysis so far is that it uses only outcomes and hence we do not know
whether lower observed promotions are the result of a lower likelihood to apply for promotion
or lower success in obtaining the promotions. We hence examine the two separate steps. We
start by considering what determines success in the contest, conditional on being a candidate,
and then move to the determinants of the decision to enter the contest.
The determinants of success in the promotion contests are assumed to be gender and the
three variables measuring publications. We also include a dummy that captures whether the
individual was, at the time of application, in an international department. This variable could
measure unobserved ability –e.g. being a good teacher– or the positive effects that being in a
more stimulating academic environment could have on the preparation of the concours. There
are as well externalities due to having colleagues who are also preparing the agregation since
candidates often work together and share the burden of preparing lectures on the various topics.
Lastly, in the regression for the agregation we include a dummy for whether the candidate holds
a position other than rank B university professor in economics (i.e. the candidate is in the Cnrs,
in another field such as mathematics, comes from abroad, etc.).
The results, reported in the first four columns of Table 4, indicate that research output is
the key determinant of the probability of success both in the agregation and the Cnrs concours.
In the former all three measures of research output have a significant coefficient, while for the
Cnrs promotion only quality matters. This is consistent with the fact that there is a stronger
selection for those joining the Cnrs than for those following the standard university track,
implying that the former are more homogeneous in terms of research output. Being in an
international department has a positive impact on the probability of passing the agregation, in
line with our arguments before, while it has no impact on the probability of being promoted in
the Cnrs contest.
Turning to our coefficient of interest, the impact of being female on the probability of
success conditional on being a candidate for promotion, we find no significant difference across
the genders. In fact, the probability of success in the agregation is 24.8% for men and 24.1%
for women, and hence not significantly different. The coefficient is insignificant both for the
raw probabilities and also when we control for individual characteristics, for professors and
causes. The first is positive discrimination when departments consciously try to increase their female faculty.
A second is unobservable abilities, such as organisational skills or teaching ability, which could be, on average,
higher amongst female than male academics, specially since fewer women than men that enter academia (see
Petrongolo and Olivetti (2008) on selection and gender). Lastly, a strong female presence could be the result of
joint offers made to couples by top departments.
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Table 4: Likelihood to be promoted conditional on applying, marginal effects
Agreg’ Cnrs Agreg’: selected candidates
1992-2008 2003-2008 1992-2008
All candidates All candidates “Admissibles” Close to threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Women -0.007 -0.018 -0.051 0.044 0.044 0.040 0.097 0.103
(0.032) (0.028) (0.078) (0.110) (0.056) (0.057) (0.082) (0.086)
Age -0.018 -0.071b -0.033 -0.042
(0.011) (0.031) (0.026) (0.039)
Age2 -0.000 0.002b 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Publisher (Pub) 0.155a 0.077 0.112 0.142
(0.047) (0.209) (0.086) (0.130)
Pub*Quantity 0.091a -0.009 0.032 -0.024
(0.019) (0.065) (0.039) (0.060)
Pub*Quality 0.047a 0.046b 0.031b 0.024
(0.006) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)
Int. Dept. 0.090a 0.019 0.130a 0.117
(0.030) (0.088) (0.046) (0.080)
Other -0.030 0.008 0.008
(0.032) (0.069) (0.108)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.015 0.183 0.020 0.184 0.015 0.056 0.005 0.025
Observations 970 970 115 115 336 336 198 198
log-likelihood -531 -441 -52 -43 -201 -192 -137 -134
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Int. Dept.
= international department; see Appendix A for details. Other: non-French Assistant Professors positions in
economics, as well as Cnrs and Inra researchers, and assistant professors from other disciplines.
researchers. Gender simply does not matter.
To interpret this result consider first the Cnrs concours. Recall that the concours consists
of submitting a vitae and research proposal. The candidate does not ‘perform’ in front of the
committee taking the promotion decision, hence the only reason why we would expect to find a
negative coefficient on women would be discrimination. We can then interpret the insignificant
coefficient as a lack of evidence of ex post discrimination against women in the contest. This
does not mean that discrimination does not matter, since expectations of discrimination may
have an ex ante effect on women’s choices and hence on observed outcomes, as discussed above.
In the case of the agregation, interpreting the coefficient is more complicated as it captures
both potential biases in the committee and the actual performance of the candidate during the
oral exams that we cannot observe. A negative and significant coefficient could then be due
to either discrimination or under-performance by women, as in the experiments performed by
Gneezy et al. (2003). Our results find no evidence of either discrimination against or under-
performance by women. It is also possible that discrimination is offset by over-performance or
that, more generally, selection is an issue. Since fewer women are candidates than men, as we
will see below, it is possible that they are drawn from the top of the distribution and hence
that their unobserved ability is higher than that of men. The insignificant coefficient could
then be the result of opposing effects canceling out: higher unobserved ability of women and
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discrimination against them.
To try to control for this, we perform two further tests exploiting the fact that for the agre-
gation contest we have information on which individuals passed each stage of the competition,
as well as the final rank. At the various stages of the competition, a number of candidates are
eliminated, and after the penultimate stage a list of candidates that are admissibles is provided
by the jury. These candidates then undertake the final test, after which a ranking of all admis-
sible candidates is provided and, if p positions are available that year, the top p candidates are
promoted.
The first test focuses on admissible candidates only. Since at this stage a substantial number
of candidates have been eliminated, if selection implies that the unobserved quality of male
candidates is lower than that of female candidates, focusing on the ‘best’ should eliminate the
(predominantly male) bottom tail of the distribution. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 present
those regressions and indicate that there is no difference between men and women in either the
raw rate of passing the last step of the context or the one obtained after controlling for output.
Not surprisingly, only the quality of publications matters at this stage. To make our sample
even more comparable, we construct from the final ranking of candidates a list of individuals
close to the threshold. To do so we take, for each year, the n admissible candidates that did
not get promoted and the n lowest-ranked candidates that did get promoted and rerun the
same regression equations. If discrimination against women were taking place, it would be
likely to appear in this reduced sample of candidates with similar observable (and probably
close unobservable) characteristics. The last two columns of Table 4 show that, if anything,
women are positively discriminated although the coefficient is not significant. In fact, none of
the variables we consider at this stage are significant.
4.2.2 Likelihood to enter the concours
We turn now to the determinants of the likelihood to enter the concours. The results are
reported in Table 5. The unconditional probability of applying is lower for women than for men
both for university professors and researchers (column 1), and the negative impact of being
female is even larger once we include individual characteristics, the marginal effect being 0.025
for professors and 0.092 for researchers. As expected, research output has a strong effect on the
likelihood of being a candidate in either of the concours, with quality having a stronger effect for
researchers. Being in an international department is significant only in the case of professors,
where it tends to increase the probability of being a candidate. This may be due to the fact
that, as we saw earlier, being in a top department has a positive effect of the probability of
success; potential candidates may anticipate this and hence be more likely to apply if they are
in those departments. An additional effect may come from peer pressure to pass the concours.
Removing this variable from the analysis has no impact on the other estimated coefficients.
The results indicate that women have a lower likelihood to enter the contest for promotion.
In terms of magnitude, being a woman is equivalent to decreasing the number of single-authored
publications by around 0.6 for the university professors and 2 for the Cnrs researchers,16 or
16The regression coefficients on gender and quantity in the regressions for the likelihood to apply for the
agregation and to apply for a Cnrs promotion are, respectively, −0.455, 0.740, −1.007 and 0.501.
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Table 5: Likelihood to apply for a promotion: marginal effects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit probit OLS logit logit probit OLS
Women -0.021a -0.025a -0.027a -0.033a -0.085a -0.092a -0.087a -0.073a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)
Age 0.001 -0.001 -0.016a 0.100a 0.097a 0.064a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a 0.000a -0.002a -0.002a -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.094a 0.094a 0.119a 0.033 0.029 0.075
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.054) (0.051) (0.047)
Pub*Quantity 0.043a 0.043a 0.050a 0.050b 0.042b 0.044b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Pub*Quality 0.010a 0.010a 0.016a 0.040a 0.040a 0.036a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Int. Dept. 0.013b 0.012b 0.014b -0.011 -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Cnrs -0.087a -0.086a -0.130a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.011 0.262 0.258 0.030 0.277 0.274
Observations 10383 10383 10383 10383 681 681 681 681
log-likelihood -2779 -2075 -2087 -297 -289 -215 -216 -213
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Int. Dept. =
international department; see Appendix A for details.
to decreasing the quality of publications by 87% and 81% of its standard deviation, for the
university professors and the Cnrs researchers, respectively.17
In order to try to understand what lies behind the gender gap in seeking promotion, we
examine whether the effect of gender differs between the two types of positions. Since the costs
of the agregation contest are substantially larger than those of applying for promotion at the
Cnrs, the coefficient on women should be higher for university professors than for researchers
if differences across the genders in these costs where holding back potential female candidates.
The first column of Table 6 hence runs a difference-in-differences regression where we have
pooled together the data for the two concours. We interact all variables with a dummy taking
the value 1 for the Cnrs concours to allow for different impacts across the two tracks, our
coefficient of interest being women interacted with this dummy.18 The coefficient is negative
and significant at the 10% level, implying that the effect of gender on the likelihood to enter the
promotion contest is twice as high in the research track. This result indicates that the time-cost
of preparing the agregation and the implications in terms of mobility are not the main reason
why women are less likely than men to apply for promotion.
As we discussed earlier, if women have a stronger relative preference for department prestige,
they may choose not to apply for promotion in order to stay in an international department.
17The coefficients on gender and quality in the agregation and the Cnrs promotion regressions are, respectively,
−0.455, 0.170, −1.007 and 0.406, and 3.07 is the standard deviation of the average quality of publications in our
sample.
18To save space, other interacted terms are not reported but are available upon request.
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Since promotion implies mobility for university professors, if females cared more about depart-
ment quality they would be less willing to move –and hence to pass the agregation– whenever
they are in an international than in a national department. In contrast, for researchers pro-
motion does not require changing department and we expect to find no effect of department of
origin on the likelihood of seeking a promotion.
We hence run again the regressions for the likelihood to apply for promotion and include
an interaction between being a woman and being in a top department. If the tradeoff between
rank (i.e. income) and department quality differed across the genders, this would be captured
by a negative coefficient on being in a top department for female professors but not for female
researchers.
Table 6: Differences across tracks and departments: likelihood to apply for a promotion,
marginal effects
All Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3)
logit logit logit
Women -0.024a -0.035a -0.085a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.031)
Age 0.004c 0.001 0.100a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.102a 0.094a 0.031
(0.012) (0.011) (0.054)
Pub*Quantity 0.046a 0.043a 0.050b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.020)
Pub*Quality 0.011a 0.010a 0.040a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Int. Dept. 0.015b 0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.032)
DR2 Cnrs*Women -0.025c
(0.013)
Women*Int. Dept. 0.031b -0.016
(0.014) (0.055)
Cnrs -0.087a
(0.002)
Interacted terms Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.260 0.263 0.277
Observations 11064 10383 681
log-likelihood -2318 -2072 -215
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Int. Dept. =
international department; see Appendix A for details. Interacted terms: all variables interacted with applying to
the DR2 Cnrs contest.
The marginal effects obtained from these regressions are reported in the second and third
columns of Table 6. Being in an international department does not affect the likelihood of female
researchers applying for promotion, while it has a positive effect on whether females enter the
agregation. For male university professors the department of origin seems not to matter. This
indicates, first, that the effect on being in an international department we obtained earlier is
driven by the effect on women in top departments. Second, note that when we consider together
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the two effects, that of women and that of women interacted with international department they
cancel out. This seems to indicate that, for university professors, women in top departments
are as likely as men to enter the concours. In contrast, women in national departments and
those with a research position have a lower probability of being candidates for promotion.
The evidence so far indicates that there is a substantial difference in the likelihood that
men and women academics apply for promotion. This gap appears both for professors and
researchers despite the differences in the costs and implications of promotion, indicating that
neither the direct costs associated with the concours nor differences in the way in which men
and women trade-off income and the quality of their department are the causes of the gender
gap in seeking promotion.
In order to gauge the importance of women’s lower propensity to apply for promotion, we
perform a Oaxaca decomposition. Given the difficulty of interpreting decomposition stemming
from logit regressions, we perform the decomposition using the OLS regression in Table 5
column (4). The raw gender gap in the probability of being promoted to rank A in our sample
amounts to 1.2 percentage points. Although this magnitude seems small, the probability of
being promoted in a given year is only 3.3% for men, implying that being a woman reduces it
by one third. As we have seen, this difference is driven by the decision to be a candidate, with an
average male probability of being a candidate of 8.4% and that for women being 2.2 percentage
points lower, i.e. gender reduces the likelihood to apply for promotion by one quarter.
Table 7: Oaxaca decomposition of the likelihood to apply: Univ. only, OLS
% of ∆ Pr(C) explained by
Characteristics -86.8
Age -115.1
Total outcome 39.0
Publisher 13.1
Quantity 28.9
Quality -3.0
International Department -3.5
Cnrs -7.2
Coefficient 186.8
Total gap 100.0
Table 7 presents the Oaxaca decomposition for the probability of being a candidate, Pr(C),
based on column (4) of Table 5, where the only coefficient that differs across the genders is the
constant. The gender gap in the probability of being a candidate is driven by the direct effect of
gender, which is partly offset by the fact that females have better characteristics in terms of age
and affiliation. The fact of being younger has the strongest impact, with a magnitude slightly
higher than that of the overall gap observed. Being in a international department also favors
women, though to a much smaller extent. In contrast, their lower research output has a negative
impact on their probability of being a candidate which amounts to 39% of the overall effect.19
19Interestingly, when we look at the three components of research output we see that women are less likely to
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The effect of research output is however dwarfed by the direct impact of being female, which
is almost five times larger. Without the advantage in characteristics, the gender gap would be
almost twice as large as the one we observe, as indicated by the fact that the coefficient on
women explains 187% of the overall gap. That is, the direct effect of being female implies that
the probability of applying for promotion for women is about half that of men, although this
effect is partly offset by women being younger and in better departments.
4.3 Networks and the competitive environment
4.3.1 Network effects
One possible reason for differences in the likelihood of seeking a promotion is that there is some
individual variable that we have so far ignored and which has an impact on the actual (or
perceived) probability of success. A candidate explanation are research networks or groups of
coauthors. The idea that networks are important in obtaining jobs and achieving promotions is
widespread in the literature, and the issue has been addressed for promotions in academia; see
McDowell and Smith (1992) for the US, Combes et al. (2008) for France and Zinovyevay and
Bagues (2012) for Spain. Coauthor networks have been shown to differ across genders, with
females having fewer coauthors and a lower fraction of male coauthors; see McDowell and Smith
(1992) and Boschini and Sjo¨gren (2007). If women have smaller or less efficient networks, then
this may affect the expected outcome and hence the payoff from entering the competition for
promotion. Potential reasons for this effect are that a candidate who has a member of her/his
network in a promotion committee has a higher likelihood of success, but also that with a larger
network the candidate’s work may be better known and cited, or that this could provide extra
information about how to best prepare for a concours. As a result, the gap that we find between
men and women could be due to differences in coauthors and networks, and hence including
these variables would have an effect on the coefficient on gender.
In order to test this hypothesis, we construct for each individual two measures of networks.
Our measures are based on coauthorship, obviously an imperfect measure of actual networks,
but one that is quantifiable with the EconLit data. Our first measure is the size of an individ-
ual’s network, defined as the total number of different coauthors the researcher has had over
his/her publishing lifetime; the second is the fraction of network members that are men. More
than in other contexts, academic networks are highly endogenous, with research output and
affiliation being both causes and consequences of an individual’s network size, and patterns
of network formation have been shown to differ across the genders; see Boschini and Sjo¨gren
(2007). Moreover, being a candidate for promotion can increase networks, especially in a system
where individuals are often candidates several years in a row, since other candidates that are
met during sessions aimed at the preparation of the agregation concours may become coauthors.
As a result, any resulting effect has to be interpreted with care, indicating correlation rather
than as having causal implications.
Table 8 reports the regressions for the likelihood of entering the promotion contest for the
two tracks, to which we have added network variables. Both variables have positive coefficients
although only one of them is significant, the proportion of men in the case of university professors
be publishers and, especially, have fewer publications, but they exhibit a higher quality of publications than men.
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Table 8: Network effects: likelihood to apply for a promotion, marginal effects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logit probit OLS logit probit OLS
Women -0.024a -0.026a -0.032a -0.091a -0.088a -0.066b
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)
Age 0.000 -0.002 -0.017a 0.097a 0.095a 0.061a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a 0.000a -0.002a -0.002a -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.086a 0.084a 0.104a -0.048 -0.057 0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.060) (0.057) (0.052)
Pub*Quantity 0.042a 0.042a 0.051a 0.041b 0.034c 0.030
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Pub*Quality 0.009a 0.009a 0.015a 0.032a 0.031a 0.030a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Int. Dept. 0.012b 0.012b 0.013b -0.010 -0.007 -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
Cnrs -0.087a -0.086a -0.131a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Pub*Network size 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.039b 0.040b 0.045b
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
% Men in Network 0.014b 0.015b 0.024a 0.057 0.058 0.046
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.263 0.259 0.291 0.290
Observations 10383 10383 10383 681 681 681
log-likelihood -2072 -2083 -291 -211 -211 -209
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Int. Dept. =
international department; see Appendix A for details.
and the network’s size for researchers. Despite the significance of these effects, the coefficients
on gender barely change as compared to our earlier specifications. The only exception is the
OLS regression for researchers where the coefficient increases from -0.073 (see Table 5) to -0.066.
That is, gender gaps in networks do not seem to explain the lower propensity of women to seek
promotion. The reason is probably that differences is network size across the genders are minor
in France. In the larger sample, the average network size is 0.88 for men and 0.82 for women,
while researchers have a large number of coauthors, averaging 2.9 for women and 3.2 for men.
These differences across the genders are not statistically significant. There is a greater gap in
the fraction of men in the network, which are 70% for females in the agregation sample and
80% for males, and although it is significant the effect of this variable is moderate and hence
its inclusion barely affects the coefficient on gender.
4.3.2 The competition’s environment
Our final test consists of examining whether the environment under which the competition takes
place affects men and women differently. We consider two variables. The first is the proportion
of women amongst rank A professors in the year of the competition, which can act as a proxy
for ‘perceived discrimination’. This variable has increased steadily over the period, going from
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8.9% in 1992 to 15.2% in 2008. The other variable is the number of available positions as
professor, which is known before the decision to be a candidate is taken, and ranges between 15
and 33, fluctuating substantially from year to year and showing no clear trend.
Since the effects of these variables can be identified only over the time dimension of the
data we consider only the concours d’agregation. For the Cnrs we have a shorter time span,
and hence little change in the fraction of women DRs (which goes from 10.6 to 10.9), while
there is too little variability in the number of positions, as either 2, 3 or 4 are available every
year. Because we are exploiting the time dimension of the data we cannot include time fixed
effects as well as the variables of interest for the entire population. We hence consider two
specifications. One includes time fixed effects and our two variables of interest interacted with
the female dummy, which allows us to see whether effects differ across the genders but not to
identify the impact on men. Alternatively, we substitute the fixed effects by a time trend and
estimate the impact of these variables for both men and women.
Table 9: The competition’s environment: likelihood to apply for a promotion, agregation, panel
1992-2008, marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logit logit logit logit
Women -0.093a -0.082a -0.090a -0.079b
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.093a 0.093a 0.093a 0.093a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Pub*Quantity 0.043a 0.043a 0.043a 0.043a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pub*Quality 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a 0.010a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Int. Dept. 0.013b 0.013b 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Cnrs -0.087a -0.087a -0.087a -0.087a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time trend -0.012a -0.012a
(0.004) (0.004)
% Women rank A 0.016 0.016
(0.011) (0.011)
Women*% Women rank A 0.007c 0.006c 0.006c 0.006c
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Men*Avail.Pos. 0.002a 0.002a
(0.001) (0.001)
Women*Avail.Pos. -0.000 0.002c -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Women*Int.Dept*Avail.Pos. 0.001b 0.001b
(0.000) (0.000)
Time FE Yes No Yes No
pseudo-R2 0.263 0.262 0.264 0.263
Observations 10383 10383 10383 10383
log-likelihood -2072 -2075 -2070 -2073
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Int. Dept. =
international department; see Appendix A for details.
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Table 9 presents the estimated regressions. Column (1) indicates that the fraction of women
amongst rank A professors has a greater effect on women than on men, and our specification
with a time trend implies that this variable has no significant effect on men. This is consistent
with the idea that perceived discrimination is a potential cause for females’ lower propensity
to apply for promotion. Nevertheless, the coefficient on being a woman remains negative and
highly significant.
The number of available positions has no differential effect across the genders, as seen in
column (1), and the coefficient on being female remains negative, large and highly significant. In
column (2) we try to identify the effect for both men and women. For ease of interpretation, we
interact this variable with a dummy that takes the value 1 for males (Men*Avail.Pos) as well as
with the female dummy (Women*Avail.Pos), implying that the coefficient on this last variable
captures the overall impact of the number of positions on women’s decisions. We can see that a
greater number of available positions increases the likelihood of being a candidate, as expected,
capturing the idea that more positions imply a greater probability of being promoted and hence
encourages individuals to apply. The coefficient is the same across the genders, although the
standard error is much greater for females, with the coefficient being significant only at the 10%
level. A possible interpretation is that women are, on average, influenced by the number of
positions just as much as men, but that there is greater variability in their reactions.
To further explore this aspect we ask whether the large variability in this effect stems
from the fact that not all groups of women behave in the same way. A possible division is
between women who are in a national and those in an international department. Women in
different types of departments may react differently towards competition because of unobserved
characteristics; in particular, some of them may be more ‘driven’ which makes them both manage
to get hired by a better department and be more responsive to the competition’s environment.
Columns (3) and (4) indicate that there is indeed a difference in the coefficients on the number
of available positions for the two groups. Women in international departments respond to the
number of positions available, with the coefficient being of the same magnitude as for men
(since the overall coefficient for this group is the sum of those on Women*Avail.Pos. and
Women*Int.Dept.*Avail.Pos.). In contrast, for women in national departments the decision to
apply for promotion seems to be unaffected by how competitive the promotion contest is likely
to be. A possible interpretation of this effect is that, contrary to their international department
counterparts, women in national departments find the idea of taking part in the contest so
unattractive that variations in the expected success rate do not affect their decision.
5 Conclusions
This paper has used data for promotions amongst academic economists in France to look at the
attitudes of women during and towards contests. We have information both on who obtained
and who was a candidate for promotion, which allows us to test different hypotheses about the
reasons that cause women’s lower promotion rates.
On the one hand, women may be less likely to be promoted conditional on having applied,
and this could be due either to discrimination or under-performance during the promotion
contest. On the other, female academics may have a lower propensity to apply for promotion
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than males. This could in turn be due to the requirements of the contest being more costly
for women, to their facing a different tradeoff between salaries and department prestige, or to
an unwillingness to enter the contest. The features of the French academic system, such as a
national salary scale, the need to go through a national contest in order to be promoted, and
the existence of several categories of academics with different requirements during the contest
and upon promotion, allow us to test for these hypotheses.
We find that there is no difference between men and women in their probability of success,
but that the later are less likely than the former to enter contests. Moreover, our results indicate
that neither the differential cost of promotion nor the tradeoff between income and department
quality are behind these differences.
There are two possible explanations for our findings. One is that although women are not
discriminated against during the contest they believe they will be, and hence decide not to
enter the competition for promotion. The data points at this as a partial explanation of gender
differences, with women being more likely to apply the more females there are amongst top-
rank academics. The alternative explanation is that women are less willing than men to enter
contests, in line with the experimental evidence provided by see Gneezy et al. (2003), amongst
others. When we try to assess the impact of the competition’s environment, we find that, unlike
for men and women in top departments, for women in other departments the likelihood to apply
for promotion is unaffected by the number of available positions in a particular year.
Our results have two main implications. On the one hand, they provide a link between
laboratory evidence and behaviour observed in actual markets, and indicate how patterns of
behaviour, namely women’s lower propensity to take part in contests, can be observed in both
contexts and what their consequences are for observed labour market outcomes. On the other,
they raise the question of what type of policy intervention can help increase female promotion
rates. The evidence in Gneezy et al. (2003) indicates that differences in contest participation
seem to be partly driven by differences across genders in preferences for taking part in compe-
titions, which can be the result of women being less confident than men. Building confidence
is a process that is difficult and probably starts in early childhood, but changes in the way in
which deciding whether to enter a competition occurs could facilitate women’s probabilities of
climbing up the rank ladder. For example, a system of mentoring whereby junior faculty are
assigned a mentor that ‘proposes’ them as candidates for promotion may incite more women
to apply. Alternatively, creating a system in which the default is that an individual will be
considered for promotion after x years and s/he has to opt out instead of opting in, could also
be a way of overcoming the differences in confidence across the genders.
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Appendix
A Definition of international departments
Academia in France is organised around ‘research centers’, with a university potentially having
several research centers in economics. We have defined ‘departments’ either by an economics
department when it is the single affiliation where economists are found in a given university
(which corresponds to the majority of cases), or by the aggregation of all research centres
where there are economists in the university. We performed robustness checks by looking
at research centres rather than departments, and obtained consistent results (available upon
request). However, our notion of slightly aggregated economics departments better matches
the reality of French academic research and hence have preferred to focus our discussion of the
results on this concept.
We define ‘international departments’ as departments with the highest research output,
measured by both the total stock and average stock of publications per member of the depart-
ment in EconLit journals. Also, we wish to take into account both “normal” quality and top
quality research, two measures that we denote CLm and CLh, respectively, following Bosquet
and Combes (2013b). In order to do so, we apply the following procedure at each point in time.
We first calculate the total research output of a department (in terms of the CLm and CLh
measures) as the sum of research outputs of its members. We also calculate the two scores per
member of the department. Hence, we obtain 4 scores per department: CLm total, CLh total,
average CLm and average CLh. Departments are then ranked with respect to these 4 scores
and their final score is the average of these rankings.
The cutoff point for top departments is arbitrary. We choose our cutoff at each point in time
so as to have 35% of the total population in the top department category. Since departments
may change their status over time, we considered as international departments for the entire
sample period those departments which are more often than not in the top department category.
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Table 10: List of international departments
Cepremap 1991 2004
Crest 1993 2008
Ecole Polytechnique 1991 2008
Ehess-Ens (Delta) 1991 2004
Enpc (Ceras, Latts) 1991 2004
Hec 1995 2008
University Aix Marseille 2-3 1991 2008
University Cergy 2005 2008
University Cergy-Paris 10 1991 2004
University Clermont 1 1991 2008
University Nancy 2-Strasbourg 2006 2008
University Paris 1 1991 2004
Paris School of Economics 2005 2008
University Paris 10 2005 2008
University Paris 9 1991 2008
Toulouse School of Economics 1991 2008
The last two columns give the first and last data at which the
departments are observed in the sample, respectively. Note
that some departments have been merged, as for instance
the Cepremap, the Ehess-Ens and the University Paris 1 to
form the Paris School of Economics from 2005.
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B Likelihood to be in an international department and to hold
a rank A position by category
Table 11: Likelihood to be in an international department and to hold a rank A position by
category, 1992-2008, marginal effects
International department Rank A
All All All Univ. Cnrs Univ. Cnrs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Women 0.020b 0.022b 0.068a 0.071a 0.079b -0.064a -0.120a
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.007) (0.023)
Age -0.010a -0.009a -0.008a -0.026a 0.011a 0.059a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
Age2 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000c -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher (Pub) 0.192a 0.196a 0.041 0.324a 0.036
(0.012) (0.013) (0.054) (0.013) (0.039)
Pub*Quantity 0.051a 0.049a 0.083a 0.147a 0.145a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.004) (0.012)
Pub*Quality 0.048a 0.047a 0.058a 0.041a 0.047a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005)
Cnrs 0.185a
(0.024)
Women*Cnrs 0.018
(0.031)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.012 0.014 0.082 0.056 0.118 0.347 0.487
Observations 16077 16077 16077 14848 1229 14848 1229
log-likelihood -10022 -9999 -9315 -8578 -721 -6212 -432
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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